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CONSENT TO PROBATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: HOW IT WAS ABOLISHED, 
AND WHY IT MATTERS 
(This is the version accepted by the European Journal of Probation on 21/7/14 and published 
online and in print on 10/12/14 in vol. 6(3) 296-307.) 
Peter Raynor 
 
Abstract: 
Much of probation theory and probation training in Britain during the 1980s emphasized the 
importance of ‘contracts’ or negotiated agreements between probation officers, probationers 
and the sentencing Court – for example, joint decision-making was central to the influential 
‘non-treatment paradigm’ and its variants. However, the legal requirement of consent to a 
probation order was abolished in 1997, partly because it was seen as diminishing the 
authority of the Court. This paper discusses the arguments and attitudes which lay behind 
abolition, and considers how far the absence of formal consent should be seen as making a 
difference in practice. Recent studies of supervision skills, therapeutic alliance, compliance 
with probation, sentencer involvement in supervision, and the role of individual choice in 
desistance from offending all point to the continuing importance of co-operation and joint 
ownership of the supervision agenda. Although these can exist in the absence of a formal 
requirement for consent, they have greater support and legitimacy when such a requirement is 
present. Finally, the article explores how official thinking and political gestures lead to 
decisions which are detached from the realities of practice, and discusses some of the current 
dangers which arise from this.  
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Introduction: the end of consent 
The aim of this article is to describe and explore an episode in the history of the probation 
order in England and Wales during the late 1990s, which passed almost without comment at 
the time, but represented an important departure from what had until then been the theoretical 
foundations of probation practice. Buried in the detail of the Crime (Sentences) Act of 1997 
was a clause seen as little more than a tidying-up exercise by civil servants, which abolished 
the requirement for a person made subject to a Probation Order to give his or her explicit 
consent in Court to the making of the Order and any additional requirements in it. This 
change attracted little attention from probation’s leaders at the time. They had other 
preoccupations: for example, there was a generally perceived need to rebuild the Service’s 
credibility following the appointment of Michael Howard as the responsible Minister in 1993 
and the consequent shift away from a policy of developing ‘alternatives to custody’, which 
had been pursued with some success in the 1980s and early 1990s (Raynor and Robinson 
2009). Whilst Howard proclaimed that ‘prison works’ (Howard 1993) the preferred strategy 
in the Probation Service was to try to show that probation worked better, and the Service was 
beginning to embark on the enthusiasm for ‘what works’ and effective programmes which 
was to lead to the world’s largest (albeit flawed) experiment in evidence-based correctional 
practice. The spirit of the time favoured finding effective replicable things to do to offenders 
rather than ways of working with them, and consent was not a priority. Although the first full 
evaluation of a cognitive-behavioural programme in a British probation area actually spent a 
good deal of time exploring whether probationers on the programme had received a full 
explanation and had the opportunity to make an informed choice (mostly they had: see 
Raynor and Vanstone 1997) and even whether probation officers had had a voice in the 
decision to implement the programme (they had), these issues were forgotten in the rush to 
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find magic bullets and ways to fire them in bulk. These managerial challenges left little time 
for what many would have regarded as philosophical niceties. 
 
The decision to abolish consent, and the official reasons for it, are set out in Government 
documents of the mid-1990s, and some aspects of it are discussed in an earlier article (Raynor 
2012). The Criminal Justice Act of 1991 had created the concept of the ‘community 
sentence’, which was a penalty, like imprisonment, but to be served in the community under 
supervision. Until then, probation had been understood as an order made ‘instead of 
sentence’, reflecting its early Anglo-American history: it originally developed out of the 
practice of conditional discharge, when Courts refrained from exercising their power to 
sentence in return for promises of good behaviour from the defendant, but could sentence for 
the original offence in addition to any new offence if the defendant was convicted of a new 
offence during the period of discharge. This required the defendant’s consent, because it was 
in effect an agreement between the defendant and the Court. Probation (meaning ‘proving’, a 
proof or test, giving the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate reform) added to the 
conditional discharge an element of personal supervision, on behalf of the Court, using close 
personal contact with an appropriate person to form a relationship with the probationer and to 
provide help and guidance (Vanstone 2004). Although other models were used in some 
jurisdictions (for example supervision backed up by suspension of prosecution, or suspension 
of imprisonment [Vanstone and Raynor 2010]), the Anglo-American approach was widely 
adopted: Max Grünhut, writing about probation in Germany, argued that the strength of 
probation ‘is due to a combination of two things, conditional suspension of punishment, and 
personal care and supervision by a court welfare officer’ (Grünhut 1952, 168).  In Britain 
probation was understood as an Order of the Court rather than a sentence, because the power 
to sentence for the offence was retained by the Court and could be used later if the 
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probationer did not comply with the requirements of the Order to which he or she had 
consented. The duties of the probation officer, as laid down in the original British legislation, 
included a duty to ‘advise, assist and befriend’ the probationer (Probation of Offenders Act 
1907, section 4[d]).  
 
The 1991 Criminal Justice Act altered this legal framework radically by making probation a 
sentence. Probation was to be one variety of ‘community sentence’: community service was 
another. Probation was no longer to be seen as an order made ‘instead of sentence’. These 
aspects of the 1991 Act were fairly readily accepted by probation leaders and most penal 
reformers: the overall aim of the Act was to reduce the use of imprisonment, and the 
probation service was being offered a ‘centre stage’ role in achieving this, which looked like 
good news. In the event, the main decarcerative provisions of the Act were quickly 
abandoned when the Government lost its nerve in the face of criticism from the press and 
from some sentencers. The prison population, after an initial short-lived decrease, went up 
again, but the changes relating to probation stayed. By the mid-1990s the Government was 
beginning to see the legal requirement of consent to a probation order (required since 
Britain’s original probation legislation in 1907) as an anomaly. The official reasoning behind 
its abolition in 1997 was as follows: ‘Probation is no longer a voluntary undertaking accepted 
by the court on condition of good behaviour, but a sentence of the court which requires 
compliance.’ The requirement for consent was ‘a derogation from the authority of the court’ 
and ‘can give the impression of a court being hesitant in its decisions or, worse, subject to the 
whims of an offender’ (Home Office 1995, 43). We will return to these arguments later.  
First, it is important to look at this decision in the context of some of the thinking and writing 
which had helped to shape British probation up to that time. In much of this work, questions 
about consent and coercion were central. 
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Therapists, radicals and the client-centred approach 
The working culture and practice theories of probation in England and Wales in the 1970s 
and 1980s are best understood in the context of its historical development. (In this article, 
‘British’ probation mainly means probation in England and Wales: Scotland has had no 
independent Probation Service since the early 1970s, although probation practice and theory 
have continued to develop there in the context of ‘criminal justice social work’ within Local 
Authorities.) During the third quarter of the 20th century probation expanded as part of the 
post-war development of a comprehensive Welfare State, and it needed a theoretical base to 
sustain expanded training courses which were being set up mainly as part of social work 
training in Universities. Social work theorists at that time looked to America, where training 
was more established, and were strongly influenced by American approaches to 
psychotherapy and counselling (see Raynor and Robinson 2009). In these approaches they 
found an emphasis on voluntarism: psychoanalysis stressed that patients’ consent was 
needed, and Carl Rogers developed an entire system of therapy around the principles of non-
directive and client-centred practice (Rogers 1951).   Social workers came to think of 
themselves as practitioners of a psychosocial therapy (Hollis 1964). Probation theorists, 
promoting the idea of social work in a criminal justice setting but working typically with 
people who were subject to a degree of control through the requirements of court orders, 
struggled to understand how similar principles could be embodied in their own work: for 
example, an influential article by Hunt (1964) argued that consent could, in effect, be 
retrospective, when probationers came to see that what had seemed oppressive or coercive at 
the time was, in fact, good for them. A much longer and more detailed version of a similar 
argument was presented in a widely read text by Foren and Bailey (1968), who argued in 
essence that probationers required direction because they were immature and not yet capable 
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of deciding everything for themselves, but as they matured they could see why the direction 
was in fact helpful. Nobody, however, was suggesting that consent and voluntarism were 
unimportant issues, or could be dispensed with. In my experience as a probation officer, 
including hundreds of hours of court duty, sentencers always remembered to ask for consent, 
sometimes in a perfunctory way, but also sometimes with careful and thorough attention to 
whether the defendant had properly understood what was proposed. Consent was usually 
given, but not always. If it was not given, the consequence would be a sentence, but not 
necessarily a severe one. I can remember very few custodial sentences passed in these 
circumstances: more often the result would be a fine. 
 
The late 1960s and 1970s saw another period of expansion both in probation and in 
mainstream social work, and an increasing tendency for both to become graduate professions. 
Some courses set out to recruit graduates and to offer postgraduate qualifications. Recruiting 
graduates in the late 1960s and early 1970s meant recruiting people who had experienced the 
political upheavals in the Universities of the late1960s, many of whom had been politicised 
as a result, and were choosing careers in social work or probation in the hope of bringing 
some benefit to disadvantaged sections of the community. Public service was a more 
attractive prospect than simply boosting the profits of some employer. Although (in almost all 
cases) they were not the subversive Marxist infiltrators that later Conservative politicians 
liked to imagine (see Aldridge and Eadie 1997), many of them brought a more critical edge to 
their understanding of crime and society, and embraced modern criminological concepts such 
as labelling and deviance. They (or we – I was recruited in 1970) were undoubtedly more 
inclined to question authority generally than many of their predecessors and seniors, and they 
usually wanted to engage with their clients on a more equal basis, not assuming pathology 
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and providing ‘treatment’ but  instead taking their views seriously, understanding their 
predicaments and aiming for a collaborative approach to problem-solving.  
 
Contemporary social work theory was also moving away from the tendency to pathologise 
and ‘treat’ towards a more collaborative approach: a good example was the ‘task-centred 
casework’ advocated by Reid and Epstein (1972) which emphasized the importance of 
agreement on target problems, priority tasks and time limits. This generated some very 
interesting experiments in Britain, including in the probation service (Goldberg et al. 1985). 
To cut a long story short, social work thinking in probation and elsewhere was developing the 
idea of negotiated agreements or ‘contracts’ between helpers and clients, and probation 
theorists had to think about how this approach to practice could be accommodated within the 
framework of a Court order. One influential paper by Malcolm Bryant and his colleagues 
(1978) argued that the probationer had a duty to the Court to comply with the basic 
requirements of the Order, but that any agreement to engage with the probation officer in a 
process of help and problem-solving was an additional, informal contract, not strictly part of 
the Court order. A more detailed and criminologically informed paper by Bottoms and 
McWilliams (1979) famously argued for a ‘non-treatment paradigm’ of probation practice, 
with an emphasis on ‘shared assessment’ and ‘collaboratively defined tasks as the basis for 
social action’. These arguments have remained influential through subsequent restatements 
and revisions (Raynor and Vanstone 1994; McNeill 2006) and continue to influence 
probation practice today. 
 
My own involvement in these debates about contract and consent was largely contained in the 
book ‘Social Work, Justice and Control’ (Raynor 1985 and 1993), which argued that a 
probation order should be understood as a three-way contract between Court, probation 
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service and probationer, negotiated in detail during the pre-sentence report process and 
formalised in Court. In essence the contract between the Court and the probationer consisted 
in a withholding of punishment, conditional on the probationer’s agreement to comply with 
probation requirements, and perhaps also to ‘make good’ in some way by reparation or by 
working to resolve the problems which led to offending. Failure to comply could terminate 
the contract and lead to other disposals, though these need not necessarily be more punitive. 
The contract between the Court and the probation service involved monitoring compliance, 
reporting breaches and trying to make the Order a success, and the contract between client 
and supervisor could (following Bryant) be limited to respect, negotiation and facilitating 
formal compliance, or could incorporate further agreements about working on problems and 
appropriate help. Breach action could only follow a failure in formal compliance, not a failure 
to be ‘helped’ (this distinction between formal and ‘substantive’ compliance has also been 
usefully explored more recently – see Robinson and McNeill [2008]). The later edition of 
‘Social Work, Justice and Control’ suggested that the Court’s sentence could be understood 
as a package, with the size of the package determined by proportionality and the seriousness 
of the offence, and the content by what was most likely to be helpful and effective in relation 
to the particular offender and the reduction of future offending. 
 
As I look back on this body of work three decades later, I have to recognise that much of it, 
including mine, was of rather uneven quality; nevertheless, such thinking was influential at 
the time. For example, when Martin Davies carried out research on probation training for the 
Home Office (which was the Government department responsible for criminal justice until 
the Ministry of Justice was set up in 2007) he found that ‘Social Work, Justice and Control’ 
was rated the second ‘most significant’ book by trainee probation officers in 1987-8 (Davies 
1989). First place, deservedly, went to McGuire and Priestley’s ‘Offending Behaviour: Skills 
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and Stratagems for Going Straight’ (1985). Interestingly, as part of the same research project 
Davies developed a questionnaire to identify probation officers with ‘anti-correctional pro-
client attitudes’, i.e. left-wing officers, who could allegedly be distinguished partly by their 
attitudes to electronic tagging (Davies and Wright 1989). I am not, however, aware of any 
official attempt to use this test to purify the workforce. To sum up, this brief survey of 
aspects of probation theory in the 1980s demonstrates the centrality of contract, or negotiated 
consent, in the theory and practice of the time. All this, however, seems to have been 
forgotten or never known by the architects of the 1997 Act, who were so concerned to protect 
the Court from the ‘whims’ of the offender.   
 
Consent and cooperation in recent research 
Recent research also tends to support the view that when people are under supervision as a 
result of offending, their views and choices matter. To mention just a few examples, a recent 
study of supervision skills shows significantly less re-offending by people supervised by  
more skilled staff, and part of being ‘more skilled’ is the ability to engage the motivation and 
participation of probationers and their active co-operation in problem-solving (Raynor et al. 
2014). Similarly, research on effective psychotherapy over many years has demonstrated the 
importance of therapeutic alliance (see, for example, Bordin 1979). Work which engages the 
co-operation of clients or service users tends to be more effective. Probationers themselves, 
given the chance, tell us much the same. For example, in a recent study of compliance with 
probation (Raynor 2013) three probationers who has successfully completed their orders after 
initial failures of compliance described how they liked probation officers to be fair and 
reasonable and prepared to discuss how to make a probation order work: ‘We managed to 
come to an agreement on one more chance, and I did it’; ‘You can get your point across, 
explain your reasons’. Compliance with probation is constructed and negotiated in the 
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relationship between supervisor and supervisee, not simply conjured into being by a court 
order (Ugwudike 2013). Even the growing field of sentencer involvement in supervision, 
pioneered in drug courts and now extending to other fields, typically involves explicit 
agreements and follow-up hearings in which supervised people give an account of their 
progress, difficulties are explored and problems addressed (McGuire 2003; McIvor 2010). 
The process seems to work most successfully when sentencers have the interpersonal skills to 
engage in a productive discussion with defendants and to elicit substantive compliance: 
‘through engaging offenders in regular dialogue about their progress and circumstances, 
judges can improve offenders’ compliance with court orders and play an active role in 
supporting their efforts to change’ (McIvor 2010, 233). There is no indication at all that 
sentencers feel their authority or dignity is undermined by these discussions with offenders: if 
anything, one could argue that the achievement of good outcomes strengthens their authority. 
In addition, the importance of effective engagement with people under supervision has been 
recognised recently by the Ministry of Justice itself in its Offender Engagement Programme 
(OEP: Rex 2012; Rex and Hosking 2014), a training initiative based on ‘core correctional 
practices’ (Dowden and Andrews 2004) and partly imitating a Canadian training initiative 
(Bonta et al. 2011); however, like so many promising initiatives, the OEP has now been 
discontinued and its future impact is uncertain. 
 
It can, of course, be argued that the practices outlined above do not actually depend on giving 
explicit consent in Court to the requirements of probation. Indeed, some of them have been 
documented in jurisdictions with no requirement for consent (e.g. England and Wales since 
1997), and it is clear that the process developed between supervisor and probationer is not 
simply the product or reflection of legal rules. It is also true, as some argued in the 1990s, 
that consent in Court could be unthinking and reflect only token compliance (‘You say yes in 
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Court because it gets you a bit of time. If you say no it’s rude and cheeky to the judge . . . you 
say yes thinking you are going to do it’ – probationer quoted in Raynor 2013, 113). 
Nevertheless, the fact that consent can have little meaning does not mean it has to. If it is 
backed up with careful discussion of options, requirements and the purpose of probation, for 
example during the pre-sentence report process, then it can help to motivate, and it can be 
used as a reminder of original intentions when these waver later in the supervision period. 
This was often my experience as a working probation officer in the 1970s. In addition, if 
legitimacy enhances compliance (Tyler 1990) then there would appear to be greater potential 
for perceived legitimacy in a system which takes defendants’ choices seriously in Court than 
in one which appears not to be interested in them. If part of the purpose of a probation order 
is to encourage the probationer’s active co-operation and participation, denial of choice 
seems a strange starting point. Defendants can make choices in or around Court about other 
matters, such as how or whether to instruct solicitors, whether to swear an oath when giving 
evidence, whether to give evidence at all, whether to apply for bail, whether to ask for time to 
pay a fine, etc. – but the expression of opinion by a potential probationer seems to have been 
regarded by the authors of the 1997 Act as an impertinence. This is an example of belittling 
and disregard of the convicted offender, and reminds us that England and Wales are among 
the few countries in Europe that still resist the idea that prisoners should be allowed to vote in 
elections. 
 
Deciding without understanding: why listen when we know best? 
In other ways too the abolition of consent was an indicator of broader issues and assumptions. 
Whilst some politicians have been inclined to use probation as a political football, and others 
(to change the metaphor) have seen it as a convenient stage on which to display tough 
gestures for their followers to admire, senior British civil servants are a highly educated and 
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usually highly competent elite, not prone to impulsive decision-making or theatrical public 
displays. However, they are typically more used to talking to each other, and to other alumni 
of the elite Universities, than to the mass of ‘ordinary’ citizens whose lives they administer. 
They do not find it unusual to decide what is best for others without actually asking them. 
This is also a well-established tendency on both the Right and the Left of British politics: 
Conservative politicians have a long tradition of paternalism, probably derived from the 
traditional relationship between rich landowners and their tenants and servants, whilst policy-
making in the Labour party can seem equally distanced from the ordinary citizen.  
 
In a recent book about the causes of policy errors by British Governments of both major 
parties, Anthony King and Ivor Crewe refer to several features of the British policy-making 
process which make mistakes more likely (King and Crewe 2013). One of these is ‘cultural 
disconnect’,  in which decisions are made without thinking about or understanding the 
circumstances and way of life of those they will affect. Among other examples they cite the 
case of Nicholas Ridley, a wealthy aristocratic Minister in one of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative governments, who was asked how an elderly couple could afford to pay new 
taxes and replied ‘Well, they could always sell a picture’ (King and Crewe 2013, 253). I have 
described elsewhere (Raynor 2013) the experience of attending a seminar on compliance with 
supervision at the Home Office in the 1990s, where a genuinely puzzled senior civil servant 
asked why offenders on probation could not put their appointments in their diaries like 
normal people. This failure to understand the often chaotic world of persistent offenders is 
widespread. Of course senior civil servants cannot really be criticised for not knowing much 
about ways of life so far removed from their own regular hours and suburban comfort, but 
they can and should be criticised when they pay little attention to those who have some 
specialist knowledge of offender supervision, or indeed to the service users themselves. The 
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long process and difficult transitions involved in desistance from crime and the construction 
of a non-offending identity were not much thought about in official circles until the 
dissemination of new literature on desistance in the early years of the 21st century (see, for 
example, Maruna 2001; McNeill 2006), and the central role played by human agency and 
offenders’ own choices in the process of desistance was clearly not part of official thinking in 
1997. The signs of ‘cultural disconnect’ are clear, though perhaps not on the monumental 
scale of Ridley’s belief that the poor could raise money by selling their art collections. 
 
One final point to be made about the abolition of consent is that it was a precursor of worse to 
come. The modern style of policy making, in which populism rules and inconvenient experts 
are disregarded as just another obstructive interest group, has led on to the current state of 
confusion and distress in probation in England and Wales, as the system prepares for a 
massive and untested programme of forced privatisation (Ministry of Justice 2013). 
Significantly, these changes were to have been subject to pilot studies, but politicians then 
decided to go ahead anyway without bothering to pilot them. One suspects that the 
politicians, mesmerised by the private sector, are more interested in achieving privatisation as 
an end in itself than in any (rather improbable) improvements in effectiveness which might 
result from it. The actual outcomes are a secondary consideration, and all this is to be 
implemented at breakneck speed in order to be in place, and largely irreversible, by the time 
of the next General Election in 2015, in case that produces a Government less fixated on this 
kind of policy.  
 
At the centre of the ‘reforms’ is a policy described as ‘Payment by Results’ (PBR), meaning 
that part of the Government’s payment to the private contractors will be conditional on the 
achievement of targets such as reductions in re-offending. However, this apparently rational 
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approach to improving effectiveness appears likely to have some perverse and self-defeating 
consequences.  It is already apparent that in order to be rewarded for meeting targets, some 
private and voluntary sector organisations will work selectively with those service users who 
are most likely to help them meet the targets (a process known as ‘creaming off’), and ignore 
the needs of others (‘parking’ them). A recent study (Merriam 2014, p. 208) includes the 
following quotation from a  manager in a voluntary organisation which is already involved in 
PBR: ‘We’ve got a “cream and park” system, which is cream off those near targets and park 
the rest. With the payment by results model we have to get results quickly.’ In this way 
contemporary developments provide yet another example of this article’s underlying theme: 
the individual wishes and needs of supervised individuals are easily sidelined by political, 
managerial, and now commercial imperatives.  
 
Sailing in the Ship of Fools 
When the distinguished civil servant and scholar David Faulkner wrote his analysis of British 
criminal justice policy (Faulkner 2001) he subtitled it ‘A Field Full of Folk’, an image drawn 
from William Langland’s 14th century religious poem ‘Piers Plowman’. Sadly, the recent 
history of the Ministry of Justice and particularly the National Offender Management Service 
(NOMS, set up in 2004 to unify the administration of prisons and probation) can suggest a 
rather different ancient image: the Ship of Fools. Originating in Book VI of Plato’s Republic 
as an allegory of political confusion, the Ship was popularised in an early international best-
seller by the 15th century German humanist Sebastian Brant, published as ‘Stultifera Navis’ 
by J. B. von Olpe in Basel in 1498 (and in several other languages). This enduring image has 
inspired many artists, including Albrecht Dürer, Hieronymus Bosch and more recently Oskar 
Laske; it has been used by literary figures as varied as Michel Foucault and the ‘Unabomber’ 
Theodore Kaczynski, and it has attracted musicians including the Doors and the Grateful 
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Dead. The essential features remain the same: a ship full of ignorant, deluded or lunatic 
passengers and crew who argue and fight over how and where to sail the ship, but lack the 
skills and knowledge to avoid the inevitable shipwreck. In some variants the captain is weak 
and easily persuaded; in others, he is himself one of the deluded unfortunates, blindly 
following his chosen disastrous course. Part of the tragedy of life aboard the ship is that not 
everyone on it is a fool, but those who have a good idea of the appropriate destination and 
how to get there cannot find enough others to agree with them, and their warnings about the 
rocks ahead are ignored. 
 
It is perhaps unnecessary to push this analogy further. Its relevance will be recognized by 
many people who have worked in or near NOMS in recent years. The remaining problem is 
how to get off the ship. Probation might become less of a political football through a re-
emphasis on local connection and on accountability to the Courts rather than to a central 
Government Department; however, it will require significant political changes before such 
options become feasible again in England and Wales. In the meantime, those who try to carry 
out useful probation research on better approaches to practice have other choices: research is 
becoming more international and comparative (for example McNeill, Raynor and Trotter 
2010; McNeill and Beyens 2013), and England and Wales are increasingly revealed to be 
exceptions, well out of the probation mainstream, rather than ‘world leaders’ as is sometimes 
claimed. My own solution has been to move much of my research (though not myself) 
offshore: the Channel Island of Jersey, although parts of its financial services industry are 
controversial, has a small, well- resourced and strongly evidence-based probation service, 
answerable to the Courts (which require consent before a probation order can be made) and 
not subject to significant political interference. It has encouraged and supported research 
which would have been difficult if not impossible to conduct in present circumstances in 
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England and Wales (see, for example, Raynor and Miles 2007; Raynor 2013; Miles and 
Raynor 2014; Raynor, Ugwudike and Vanstone 2014). In addition, probation in Jersey is a 
public service for the benefit of the community, and the instruments and methods developed 
in the recent research on supervision skills are not being marketed for profit but are freely 
available on the Jersey Probation and After-Care Service website. In a recent television 
broadcast the French Minister for Justice suggested that Jersey’s probation service could be a 
model for France (francetvinfo, 2014).  
 
Other travellers may find other ways to leave the Ship of Fools, or indeed the ship itself 
might find its way, somehow, to a more satisfactory destination. As far as probation is 
concerned, I would suggest that this would include a reconfigured and more traditional 
understanding of the purposes of probation, and of the relationship between punishment, help 
and consent. Even if shipwreck is unavoidable, a knowledge of the past, and of what was 
once seen as good and helpful practice, may be useful in the process of reconstruction. This 
article is intended as a modest contribution to describing where we have come from. 
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